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Introduction
The potential e¤ect of the threat of unionisation on employers' behaviour has long been acknowledged in Economics especially within the very large literature on union wage e¤ects.
In particular, several studies have attempted to identify the threat e¤ect on non-union wages by using union density in industry/…rms not covered by collective bargaining (Rosen, 1969; Freeman and Medo¤, 1981; Lewis, 1986; Neumark and Wachter, 1995; Corneo and Lucifora, 1997) . This approach, however, does not tackle the potential endogeneity of union threat since union density itself is likely to be correlated with unobservables that might a¤ect wages in the workplace. Three more recent papers have therefore explored other identi…cation strategies. DiNardo and Lee (2004) looked at the behaviour of wages in US …rms where unions lost a recognition ballot by a small margin. Bel…eld and Heywood (2001) and Farber (2005) investigated the e¤ects of the predicted probability of union membership (recognition) at the individual (…rm) level in the UK and in the US respectively. This literature has produced mixed results, but the balance of the evidence seems to lend some support to the hypothesis that the threat of unionisation increases non-union wages.
The focus of the literature on the wage e¤ects of the union threat is motivated by concerns that the estimates of union e¤ects might be biased by threat e¤ects. It is, however, clear that …rms aiming at forestalling unionisation can also put in place explicit or implicit antiunion activities (Booth, 1995) . Such activities are widely documented in the US as reported by DiNardo and Lee (2004) 1 and there is some indication of their presence in the UK as well (Dundon, 2002) . Concerns have been raised in this latter country that union avoidance practices might become more widespread as a consequence of the legislation that since 2000 enables unions to obtain recognition in a workplace even against the will of the management (Oxenbridge et al., 2003) . The recent increase in voluntary recognition agreements (ACAS, 2004; Blanden et al., 2006) suggests that the mere introduction of such provision has had an e¤ect beyond its actual use by unions. In other words, the threat posed by the new statutory union recognition procedure has led some employers to recognise unions voluntarily. Other employers, however, might have tried to resist the reinvigorated threat of unionisation. This paper investigates the hypothesis that …rms attempting to avoid unionisation have become more prone to hire workers who are less likely to join a union in the …rst place.
This paper makes several substantive contributions. First, it provides what appears to be the …rst empirical evidence on the e¤ect of the threat of unionisation on a predominantly non-union type of employment, i.e. temporary employment. The evidence that temporary employees tend to be less unionised is clear. Using data from the Labour Force Survey for the UK, DTI (2005) reports that in 2004 (the most recent year considered in this paper) union density was 29.5% among permanent workers and 17.2% among temporary employees, with large di¤erences both within the public (60.9% vs 34%) and the private (17.8% vs 7.1%)
sector . Also data from the 2004 wave of the European Social Survey point at large di¤erences in union density by contract type across Europe 2 . In addition, Eurofound (2010) reviewed the initiatives undertaken by unions to recruit new members and pointed out that temporary workers are reported to be very di¢ cult to unionise across the 27 EU countries and Norway.
Second, in focusing on temporary employment this paper also contributes to our understanding of the reasons behind the widespread use of limited-duration contracts in modern labour markets. The importance and relevance of the issues surrounding such type of employment both in Europe and in the US are testi…ed by a growing body of literature (Autor, 2009; Booth et al., 2002; Arulampalam and Booth, 1998; Arulampalam et al., 2004; OECD, 2002; Kahn, 2007; Arulampalam et al., 2004; Brunello et al., 2007; Salvatori, 2010) . In particular, some studies have looked at the relationship between unionisation and the use of temporary workers reporting mixed results. There is some evidence of a negative e¤ect in the US with micro data (Gramm and Schnell, 2001; Houseman, 2001 ), but not with aggregate data (Autor, 2003) . For Europe, evidence consistent with a positive e¤ect is found in a number of EU countries and in particular in the UK (Bryson, 2007; Böheim and Zweimüller, 2 In the UK, only 12% of workers on contracts of limited duration are union members, while union density is above 22% among permanent workers. Large di¤erences are found even in countries with traditionally high union membership such as Sweden (68% for permanent workers, 51% for temporary workers), Norway (59% vs 28%) and Finland (60% vs 46%). 3 2009; Salvatori, 2009) . Of course, the variability in the estimates of the gross e¤ect might well be due to the relative importance in di¤erent contexts of the di¤erent channels through which the e¤ect of unions on temporary employment unfolds. For instance, unions may favour the presence of some temporary workers as a bu¤er for their permanent workers, but temporary workers can also be seen as a threat to union strength (Heery, 2004) . For the UK, Böheim and Zweimüller (2009) interpret the fact that bargained wages are lower in the presence of agency worker as an indication that such workers are employed "against the union". However, …rms employing agency workers might be low-wage …rms for other reasons. More generally, disentangling the individual channels empirically is very di¢ cult since it requires exogenous shocks that activate each of these independently -a very unlikely scenario. This paper makes some headway on this point by investigating whether …rms use temporary workers "against unions" when exposed to an exogenous increase in the threat of unionisation. More broadly, the …ndings of this analysis can help reveal whether the available estimates of the e¤ects of unions on temporary employment su¤er from a threat bias.
A third contribution of this study lies in the original empirical strategy to identify the e¤ect of the threat of unionisation. In particular, the paper uses data on private sector establishments from the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) to conduct a di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis which exploits the fact that the statutory union recognition procedure introduced in 2000 only a¤ected British …rms with more than 20 employees. The underlying identi…cation assumptions are carefully discussed and their credibility assessed within the constraints of the available data. The di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis comparing …rms above and below the 20-employee threshold is extended to use unionised …rms as an additional control group in what is often referred to as a "triple-di¤erence" analysis. This has the advantage of allowing for potential di¤erences in underlying trends between smaller and larger …rms, which in the standard di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis are restricted to be the same. In addition, the availability of information on employment levels over time is exploited to search for any evidence of …rms manipulating the level of employment in order to avoid the threat of unionisation.
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The results di¤er depending on the speci…c type of temporary contract considered. In fact, while for …xed-term workers there is no evidence of an e¤ect, there is some support for the hypothesis of a negative e¤ect of the threat of unionisation on the probability that …rms employ agency workers. The estimates suggest a sizeable e¤ect exceeding -10%. However, due to the limited size of the groups compared in the analysis these e¤ects are not always estimated with high statistical precision. Overall, therefore, there is no evidence that …rms which become exposed to the threat of unionisation react by hiring more temporary workers although they are known to be less likely to join a union.
Literature
The possible e¤ect of the threat of unionisation on employers'behaviour in non-union …rms has long been acknowledged in Economics, one of the earliest contributions being Lewis (1963) . While Verma (2003) reviews some case studies that point to a role of union threats in the di¤usion of employee voice systems in non-union …rms, the vast majority of the literature has focused on its e¤ects on wages. Farber (2005) brie ‡y reviews some of the theoretical models that explicitly account for the fact that employers may want to forestall unionisation. The empirical literature on union threats has also mostly focused on wage e¤ects. Most papers have attempted to identify the e¤ect of union threat by looking at union density within sectors or …rms not covered by collective bargaining. Using di¤erent versions of this approach, Rosen (1969); Freeman and Medo¤ (1981) ; Neumark and Wachter (1995) studied the union threat e¤ects in the US. The evidence of these papers and that reported in the review by Lewis (1986) provides some support for the hypothesis that threat of unionisation increases wages in non-unions sectors or …rms. Corneo and Lucifora (1997) report similar evidence for Italy. Bel…eld and Heywood (2001) o¤ers the …rst study of the UK labour market using both data on union density at the industry level and workplace level data on the probability of becoming unionised 3 . They conclude that, on the one hand, non-union …rms in highly unionised industries do tend to o¤er higher wages, but on the 3 They use the 1998 wave of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey, which is also used in this paper.
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other hand the threat of unionisation does not induce the same wage compression within non-unionised …rms which is observed in unionised …rms. Bel…eld and Heywood (2001) di¤er from most previous contributions in that they do not rely only on union density measures to identify the e¤ect of the threat of unionisation. Two other recent papers using alternative identi…cation strategies are those by DiNardo and Lee (2004) and Farber (2005) , both of which use US data. In particular, DiNardo and Lee (2004) use an "event-study" approach that looks at workplaces where the unions lost the ballot to obtain recognition. They …nd evidence of little or no change in wages in the years leading up to the election. Farber (2005) reports no evidence of union threat e¤ects as captured by the predicted probability of union membership, but …nds empirical support for union threat e¤ects when exploiting deregulation within three industries as a natural experiment.
This paper adds to this literature by employing an original identi…cation strategy which exploits the introduction of a statutory union recognition procedure in the UK as a source of exogenous variation in the threat of unionisation.
3 The statutory union recognition procedure
The empirical strategy of this paper exploits the introduction of a statutory union recognition procedure in the UK that enables a union to obtained recognition in a workplace even against the will of the management. Such provision was passed in July 1999 within the Employment Relations Act and came into e¤ect in June 2000 4 . The Act sets out some requirements that must be met for a union to qualify to apply for recognition:
1. the employer must have at least 21 employees.
2. the union must show that at least 10% of employees in the proposed bargaining unit are Union members.
3. the union must convince the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) that a majority of employees in the proposed bargaining unit are "likely" to support union recognition.
Once the CAC declares that a union is recognised the union is entitled to bargain over pay, hours, holidays and training issues.
The stated aim of this provision was to encourage voluntary recognitions (Wood and Goddard, 1999; Oxenbridge et al., 2003; Blanden et al., 2006 ). An o¢ cial Government review (DTI, 2003) has also been detected in survey data (Blanden et al., 2006) and it is likely to be one of the factors behind the end of the historically decreasing trend in union recognition in …rms with more than 25 employees recorded in the 2004 wave of WERS (Kersley et al., 2005) , the survey used in this paper. Overall therefore, there is strong indication that the new statutory procedure contained a "threat element" which in a number of cases induced employers to seek voluntary recognition agreements. The same threat might however have induced other employers to adopt union avoidance practices (Dundon, 2002; Oxenbridge et al., 2003) .
As will become clear in section 4, the timing of the reform has important implications for the credibility of the empirical strategy adopted in this paper. It is therefore useful to provide some more details on the process by which the new legislation came to be adopted.
The principle that a union should be recognised if a majority of workers in a given work-place voted in favour was stated in the 1997 Labour Manifesto which, however, did not mention any requirements that should be met by a …rm/workplace for the new provision to be applicable. The 1998 White Paper on "Fairness at Work" did explicitly mention the 20-employees threshold. The paper was released in May 1998 following consultations with CBI and TUC, but did not contain a precise timetable for the actual implementation of the new statutory union recognition procedure.
Empirical Strategy
Following the introduction of the statutory union recognition procedure, unions can obtain recognition even against the will of the management in …rms satisfying the requirements set out by the Employment Relations Act of 1999. This paper exploits the fact that only some …rms became exposed to this "threat of unionisation" to try and identify its e¤ect on the propensity of …rms to use temporary employment.
The core of the empirical strategy is a simple di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis that uses data on British establishments before (in 1998) and after (in 2004) the introduction of the statutory union recognition procedure. To begin with, the focus is restricted on the subsample of private sector …rms with no recognised unions which are divided into a treated and a control group. The treated group include …rms satisfying the requirements for the new procedure to be applicable. i.e. those which became exposed to the threat of unionisation as a result of the new legislation. While section 6 discusses the details concerning the de…nition of such groups, here su¢ ce it to say that the treated group includes …rms with more than 20 employees and is identi…ed by the dummy variable T reated.
The di¤erence-in-di¤erence identi…cation strategy compares the change over time in the outcome of the control group and the treated group. The relevant outcome here is the probability of using temporary employment. The estimate of the e¤ect of interest can be obtained by estimating the following regression function:
where t = 1998; 2004, and T emp is 1 if any temporary employees are employed and P ost is a dummy for 2004. The coe¢ cient 1 picks up systematic di¤erences between the treated and the control group and 2 measures the time e¤ects a¤ecting both groups in the same way. Finally, 3 is the coe¢ cient of interest as it measures the extent to which the change in the outcome in the post-reform period di¤ers between the treated and the control …rms.
Since equation 1 represents a saturated model, the conditional expectation of the LHS variable is linear in the included regressors, fully justifying the use of OLS. The inclusion of additional controls does introduce potential complications. However, since most of the RHS variables employed in the analysis (and discussed in section 5) are discrete, a linear probability model can still be expected to provide a good approximation (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Wooldridge, 2002) . In light of this and given the advantages in terms of the ease of the interpretation over other models for binary outcomes, the empirical analysis uses OLS even when additional covariates are included.
The identi…cation of the e¤ect of the threat of unionisation relies on the assumption that the treated and the control group share a common trend. In other words, had the new legislation not been introduced, the propensity to use temporary employment would have changed in the same way for the two groups. The common trend is captured by the P ost dummy. The deviation of the treated group from this common trend is picked up by the interaction P ost T reated and interpreted as the e¤ect of treatment. The commontrend assumption is generally more credible when changes in observable characteristics are accounted for by including additional controls into the basic model of equation 1. Since the treated and the control groups are de…ned based on the 20 employees-threshold, the common-trend assumption here implies that …rms above and below such threshold share a trend in the propensity to use temporary employment. Intuitively, the credibility of such assumption may depend on the upper limit chosen for the treated group, that is the one including …rms with more than 20 employees. Hence, the sensitivity of the results to a number of upper-limits is checked as described in section 6. When several time periods are available, one can further investigate the common-trend assumption by studying trends in the outcomes before the policy change (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) . Unfortunately, the analysis of this paper can only rely on data from two points in time. Alternatively an additional control group can be used to account for a di¤erent underlying trend. I return to this below.
The identi…cation of the causal e¤ect of the threat of unionisation also rests on the assumption that there are no confounding e¤ects from changes in the composition in unobservables. Since this assumption would be violated if subjects could move between the treated and the control group this is often referred to as the "no-movers assumption" (Lee, 2005) . Assessing its credibility is particularly important when using repeated cross-sections given the lack of convincing ways to account for unobserved heterogeneity. In light of this, I
…rst follow the previous literature by checking the robustness of the results to the exclusion of potential movers (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Kugler et al., 2005; Kugler and Pica, 2008) .
I then investigate if there is any evidence of …rms manipulating employment around the 20-threshold set out by the law for the applicability of the new statutory union recognition procedure. The details of this are described in section 6.1.
This latter check also provides a way to investigate another potential problem that might a¤ect the empirical analysis of this paper, namely the possibility that some …rms may have modi…ed the level of employment even before the implementation of the new policy. Such anticipatory behaviour could alter the composition of the treated and the control group in a way that could confound the estimates of the e¤ect of the policy even in the absence of movers across two time periods considered (Blundell and Dias, 2009 ). The availability of data on the level of employment in di¤erent years before the introduction of the new legislation provides the opportunity to verify the existence of such anticipatory behaviour.
Triple-di¤erence
Since the groups are de…ned based on the employment level, the common-trend assumption discussed in the previous section requires small and large …rms to share a trend in the propensity to use temporary employment. Clearly, controlling for employment in the di¤erence-in-di¤erence regressions make this assumption more credible as it removes the ef-fect of employment per se. However, this does not account for the possible di¤erences in trends in the propensity to use temporary employment between …rms with di¤erent levels of employment. Hence, the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate could still confound the true e¤ect of the policy and the time e¤ect a¤ecting all …rms with more than 20 employees. To try and disentangle the former from the latter, an additional control group is required.
For the purpose of this paper, any unionised …rm is non-treated and can be part of an additional control group. In particular, unionised …rms with more than 20 employees can be exploited to try and isolate any time e¤ect a¤ecting all …rms with more than 20 employees, regardless of their union status. The model of interest can then be written as:
5 P ost Above21 it + 6 P ost N onU nion it
This model now accounts for time e¤ects a¤ecting all groups (P ost), common trends between …rms with more than 20 employees (P ost Above21) and common trends between non-unionised …rms (P ost N onU nion). The interaction Above21 it N onU nion it identi…es the same …rms as the T reated dummy in equation 1. The coe¢ cient of interest in this case is 7 which measures the change in the propensity to use temporary employment after treatment for the treated group. This can be interpreted as the di¤erence between two di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimators, hence the name "triple di¤erence" found in the literature (Hamermesh, 2000; Lee, 2005) . The …rst di¤erence-in-di¤erence compares non-unionised …rms above and below the 20-employee threshold and identi…es the sum of the treatment e¤ect and a time*Above21 e¤ect ( 5 + 7 ). The second one compares unionised …rms below and above the threshold and identi…es only the time*Above21 e¤ect ( 5 ) since neither of these groups were treated. It follows that the di¤erence between these two yields the pure treatment e¤ect 7 . Clearly, the identi…cation assumption here is that unionised and nonunionised …rms with more than 20 employees share a common trend picked up by 5 . Under this assumption, any e¤ect captured by the coe¢ cient on the interaction P ost Above21 N onU nion can be interpreted as the treatment e¤ect.
Data and speci…cation
The data used in this paper come from the management questionnaires of the 1998 and 2004
waves of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). The two independent crosssections are appended and only the subsample of workplaces operating in the private sector with more than 10 employees is retained. Since WERS is a complex survey, weights are used throughout the analysis to account for strati…cation and clustering. Since the di¤erence-indi¤erence analysis of this paper only compares two groups over two time periods, there is no convincing way to address the potential within-group and over-time correlation which has attracted much attention in the recent literature (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2008; Angrist and Pischke, 2009 ).
The number of controls that can be included in the regression analysis is limited by issues of comparability between the two waves. The di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates reported below are all obtained from speci…cations including controls for the level of employment, age of the establishment, and occupation shares. Moreover, I always include dummies for independent establishments, establishments producing more than one product, market shares, geographical market (regional, national, international), presence of foreign competition, presence of cost targets, industry and regions. As discussed in section 4, a number of linear probability models are estimated and three di¤erent dependent variables are considered.
In particular, F ixT is a dummy for the presence of …xed-term workers in the workplace, T AW is a dummy for the presence of agency workers and …nally AnyT emp is a dummy for the presence of …xed-term or agency workers.
De…nitions of control and treated groups
The analysis begins by comparing the behaviour over time of two groups of non-unionised …rms. The treated group is made up of …rms which became exposed to the threat of unionisation as a result of the introduction of the new statutory union recognition procedure. The precise de…nition of such groups depends of course on the requirements set by the law but must also be informed by the assumptions needed for the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator to identify the causal e¤ect of the threat of unionisation. In particular, care must be taken to ensure the credibility of the two fundamental assumptions discussed in section 4, namely those of common trends and lack of movers across the treated and control groups.
One of the requirements set out by the law for the statutory union recognition procedure to be applicable is that at least 10% of employees in the proposed bargaining unit must be union members. Not surprisingly, the data do not allow me to identify such (potential) "bargaining units" within a workplace. On the other hand, measures of union membership at the workplace level are available in WERS, but very few …rms not recognising a union report the presence of union members. For example, in the 2004 cross-section there are no more than 88 non-unionised …rms with 21 to 100 employees and at least some union members. Moreover, serious concerns can be raised on the reliability of measures of union membership as reported by the managers of …rms that do not recognise any unions. In light of these issues, the treated and the control groups are de…ned using only the employment level. This can possibly result in an attenuation bias since it e¤ectively in ‡ates the treated group at the expense of the control group.
The lower employment limit for the treated group is set out by the law (21 employees), but the upper limit must be chosen to enhance the credibility of the common-trend assumption underlying the di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach. This suggests choosing a low upper limit to ensure that the control and the treated …rms are not too di¤erent in terms of employment levels. On the other hand, lowering the upper-limit reduces cell-sizes. For this reason, the empirical analysis considers a number of alternative upper limits for the employment level of the treated group and veri…es the robustness of the results to each of them.
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Another issue to be considered is the time period of the level of employment used to de…ne the groups. This is a potentially important point to ensure that neither group su¤ers from self-selection. To try and mitigate this problem, the existing literature has either used information on the pre-reform period to de…ne the treated and control group or has excluded movers across groups over time completely (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Kugler et al., 2005; Kugler and Pica, 2008) . The availability of information on past employment levels in each of the two waves of WERS makes it possible to pursue this latter approach in this paper as well.
Using past information to de…ne the groups does not necessarily solve the self-selection problem if …rms started to adjust employment early in anticipation of the new legislation (Blundell and Dias, 2009) . For the analysis of this paper, this means that …rms would have started to adjust employment as early as 1998 in anticipation of a reform that came into e¤ect in 2000. This seems rather unlikely especially in light of the fact that the relevant threshold of 20 employees was …rst mentioned in an o¢ cial government document in 1998.
Nevertheless, the availability of information on past employment in both waves of WERS provides an opportunity to test the hypothesis that …rms changed the level of employment in response to the new legislation.
Did …rms change the level of employment?
The two waves of WERS contain information on past employment (in 1993 and 1997 for the 1998 wave, and in 1998 and 2003 for the 2004 wave). This provides the opportunity to investigate the hypothesis that non-unionised …rms around the 20-employee threshold modi…ed their level of employment in response to or in anticipation of the statutory union recognition procedure. This will be referred to as the "movers hypothesis". The …rst set of tests considered are based on the idea that …rms just above and just below the 20-employee threshold would behave di¤erently under this hypothesis. In particular, in order to avoid being subject to the new provision, …rms just above the threshold would tend to decrease employment, while …rms just under the threshold would resist increasing the number of employees. The tests therefore look at di¤erences in the probabilities of increasing/decreasing employment between …rms on the two sides of the 20-employee threshold.
To see how a formal test can be conducted, focus …rst on the probability of decreasing employment. Let EmplDown_tx be 1 if a …rm decreased employment between t x and t.
Then consider the following simple regression:
where Empl_tx_16_25 is a dummy taking the value 1 if the level of employment at t x was between 16 and 25 employees, and Empl_tx_21_25 i is 1 if employment at t x was between 21 and 25 employees. The coe¢ cient 2 therefore captures the di¤erence between …rms with 21 to 25 employees and those with 16 to 20 employees. Under the movers hypothesis, one would expect 2 > 0. In the empirical analysis this equation is extended to control for employment at t x, industry and region dummies. When carried out using the 1998 sample and x = 1, this can be taken as a test that …rms anticipated the policy. On the 2004 sample with x = 6, this is a test for the presence of movers.
This test rests on the assumption that in the absence of the policy change …rms just above and just below the 20-employee threshold would have behaved in the same way. To account for the possibility that these two groups might have behaved di¤erently even in the absence of the new legislation, one needs to …nd two other groups that o¤er a good approximation of this missing counterfactual. One possibility is to consider groups of …rms just above and below another threshold that has nothing to do with the statutory union recognition procedure. In order to ensure comparability, it appears reasonable to choose a "fake" threshold not too far from 20. For example, one can compare the di¤erence between …rms around the 20-employee threshold with the di¤erence between …rms around the 30-employee threshold. This can be done in a linear regression that reads as follow:
where the dummies are constructed following the same logic as in equation 3 and 
Hence, the coe¢ cient 4 is e¤ectively a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator comparing the di¤erence between …rms above and below the 20-employee threshold (eq. 6-eq. 5) and the di¤erence between …rms below and above the 30-employee threshold (eq. 8-eq. 7).
A positive 4 is consistent with the hypothesis that …rms reacted (in anticipation) to the statutory union recognition provision.
Two alternative comparison groups are provided by unionised …rms around the 20-employee threshold. To use these groups, one can estimate the model: EmplDown_tx iy = + 1 Empl_tx_16_25 iy + 2 Empl_tx_21_25 iy (10)
3 Empl_tx_16_25 iy P ost + 4 Empl_tx_21_25 iy P ost
where now the subscript y = 1998; 2004 and P ost is a dummy which is 1 for 2004. Similar tests can be conducted looking at the probability of increasing employment of …rms just below 20 employees. Under the movers hypothesis, these …rms should be less likely to increase employment than those with more than 20 employees. Tests that parallel those just described can be performed by estimating the following equations:
The movers assumption would imply that 2 < 0. To use …rms around the 30-employee threshold as comparison groups, one can estimate the model:
To use unionised …rms around the 20-employee threshold as comparisons groups, the following model can be estimated:
In both equations 12 and 13 4 < 0 is consistent with the movers hypothesis.
Finally, to exploit the availability of di¤erent time periods one can resort to:
EmplU p_tx iy = + 1 Empl_tx_16_25 iy + 2 Empl_tx_16_20 iy (14)
3 Empl_tx_16_25 iy P ost + 4 Empl_tx_16_20 iy P ost
When the focus is on the 1997-98 (2003-04) employment change, 4 > 0 ( 4 < 0) is consistent with the movers hypothesis.
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6.2 Cell sizes and evidence on employment manipulation Table 1 Overall, therefore, there is some evidence of anticipatory behaviour in 1998 but not of movers between 1998 and 2004. Some of the di¤erences found in this exercise might, of course, be accounted for by …rm characteristics that cannot be controlled for here due to data limitation, but that are taken into account in the main analysis of the paper. As already 20 mentioned, the robustness of the results to the exclusion of movers is checked throughout the analysis, although this exacerbates the problem of small cell sizes. Unfortunately, there is no obvious solution to the problem posed by the possible anticipatory behaviour of …rms in 1998 and the direction of the bias that this might generate cannot be established with certainty. One plausible scenario is that the …rms that did change the level of employment in anticipation of the new legislation are those which are more sensitive to the threat of unionisation. Hence, they might have been even more likely to react to the union threat had they not avoided it. This would result in attenuation bias in the estimate of the e¤ect of the threat of unionisation.
Results
The di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate of the e¤ect of the union threat on the use of temporary employment are reported in tables 5 and 6 for the probability of …xed-term workers and agency workers respectively 6 . In all cases the coe¢ cient of interest is the one on the T reated P ost interaction. Each table reports the results for the two de…nitions of the treated group and for a number of alternative upper-limits for the level of employment of the treated group.
For the probability of using …xed-term workers, table 5 shows that the coe¢ cient of interest is generally positive but its size appears sensitive to di¤erent de…nitions of the treatment group and its standard errors are always too large to reach statistical signi…cance at any conventional level. On the other hand, for agency workers table 6 shows some weak evidence of a negative e¤ect of the introduction of the statutory union recognition provision.
The estimated P ost T reat coe¢ cient is consistently negative and its size is relatively stable when …rms with more than 31 employees are included in the sample, as showed in the last three columns of the table. The similarity of the estimates across panels indicate that the results are not very sensitive to the exclusion of potential movers. Also, some of the coe¢ cients are estimated precisely enough to reach statistical signi…cance at the 10% or even 5% signi…cance level. Most estimates, and in particular those statistically signi…cant, are in the neighborhood of a 10% e¤ect.
These estimates are obtained by comparing non-unionised …rms above and below the 20-employee threshold 7 . To try and control for di¤erences in underlying trends between smaller and larger …rms, an additional control group made up of unionised …rms with more than 20 employees can be exploited. This leads to the "triple-di¤erence" estimates of the e¤ect of the threat of unionisation which are reported in tables 7 and 8 for the two probabilities of interest 8 . In these tables, the coe¢ cient picking up the e¤ect of the union threat is that on the triple interaction P ost N onU nion Above21.
The results in table 7 show that the estimate of the e¤ect of the threat of unionisation on the probability of using …xed-term workers is now negative in both the top and the bottom panels. The positive coe¢ cients attracted by the P ost Above21 interaction suggests that the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates of table 5 confounds the trend in larger …rm with the e¤ect of interest 9 . None of these coe¢ cients, however, is estimated with statistical precision.
Conversely, higher precision is attained when looking at the probability of using agency expected. In fact, in spite of the larger sample size due to the inclusion of non-unionised …rms in the sample, the size of the treated group remains the same although the treated 7 Not surprisingly, the results for the probability of using either …xed-term or agency workers (vs neither of them) are mixed and inconclusive. These results are available from the author upon request.
8 All the regressions presented in tables 7 and 8 were also ran excluding from the sample unionised …rms in 2004 which had become unionised in the previous 6 years (the only time span considered in the 2004 questionnaire). This is an attempt to mitigate the problem of movers between the unionised and nonunionised group in response to the statutory union recognition procedure. The results obtained in this fashion are substantially the same as the ones reported here and are available from the author upon request. 9 The coe¢ cients in table 7 do not add up exactly to those in table 5 because the use of di¤erent samples imply a di¤erent set of restrictions on the coe¢ cients of the other covariates.
…rms are now used to estimate more parameters 10 .
To sum up, the results di¤er between the two types of temporary workers considered in the analysis. For …xed-term workers, there is no evidence of an e¤ect of the threat of unionisation since the di¤erence-in-di¤erence and the triple-di¤erence results di¤er in signs, vary considerably across de…nitions of the treated group and are never statistically signi…cant. On the other hand, there is tentative evidence that the threat of unionisation decreases the probability that …rms use agency workers. The estimated e¤ect is negative in both the di¤erence-in-di¤erence and the triple-di¤erence analysis. The former suggests a 10% e¤ect, while the latter a 20% e¤ect and neither estimates appear very sensitive to the exclusion of potential movers. However, as one would expect in light of the limited cell sizes discussed in section 6.2, statistical precision is not always high particularly in the triple-di¤erence analysis.
Discussion of results
This paper has exploited the introduction in the UK of a statutory union recognition procedure to identify the e¤ect of the threat of unionisation on the propensity of …rms to use temporary employment. Since such a procedure can only be applied in …rms with more than 20 employees, a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator has been used to compare non-unionised …rms above and below that threshold. While there is no evidence of an e¤ect on the probability of using …xed-term workers, the analysis has provided some support in favour of the hypothesis that …rms that came to be exposed to the threat of unionisation became less likely to use agency workers.
The causal interpretation of such …nding rests on two fundamental assumptions. The …rst one is that the propensity to use agency workers in the absence of the new legislation would have changed in the same way in the treated and in the control group. The credibility of the results is reinforced by the use of a triple-di¤erence estimator which accounts for possible di¤erences in trends between larger and smaller …rms. This set of results is generally less statistically signi…cant but suggests an even stronger negative e¤ect of around 20%.
The second assumption underlying the causal interpretation of the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate is that the composition of the treated and the control group remained stable over time. Some simple tests revealed no evidence that …rms manipulated the level of employment between 1998 and 2004 to avoid the threat of unionisation. Moreover, both the di¤erence-in-di¤erence and the triple-di¤erence results show relatively little sensitivity to the exclusion of potential movers from the sample. There is however some indication in the data that …rms might have manipulated the level of employment as early as 1998. The hypothesis that this might have happened in anticipation of the forthcoming legislation appears rather unlikely, but cannot be ruled out. No obvious solution to this potential problem can be applied with the available data. As for the direction of the bias that this might generate in the estimate of interest, it clearly depends on how these …rms would have behaved had they not left the treated group. One plausible possibility is that they would have been even more likely to react to the threat of unionisation than those which remained in the treated group. Under this assumption, this anticipatory behaviour may produce an attenuation bias in the estimate of the e¤ect of the union threat. Another source of a potential bias towards zero is the fact that due to data limitation the treated group could only be de…ned based on employment while the requirement in terms of presence of union members had to be ignored as discussed in section 6.
Overall, therefore there is no evidence that …rms use (less unionised) temporary employees to avoid the threat of unionisation. A possible explanation of the negative e¤ect found for agency workers is o¤ered by previous evidence on the relationship between permanent workers and temporary workers. Pearce (1993) , Broschak and Davis-Blake (2006) and Kraimer et al. (2005) report evidence that permanent employees working alongside temporary employees have less trust in the organization, increased turnover intensions and often perceive their temporary co-workers as a threat. A …rm concerned about the possibility that workers could organize a union may therefore be reluctant to employ temporary workers.
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Cast in the framework of the research on the relationship between unionisation and the use of temporary employment, this result can be read as evidence against the hypothesis that …rms use (less unionised) temporary employees to weaken a union. Clearly the behaviour of …rms once a union has been established might well di¤er, but this result certainly does not provide support for the hypothesis that the positive e¤ect of unions on the probability that …rms use temporary workers (Bryson, 2007; Böheim and Zweimüller, 2009; Salvatori, 2009) is driven by the fact that such employees are hired "against the union". More broadly, in light of these results it appears unlikely that the desire of …rms to avoid unionisation is one of the major determinants of the widespread use of temproary contracts across Europe.
Conclusion
This paper has presented the …rst study of the e¤ect of the threat of unionisation on the propensity of …rms to use a predominantly non-union type of employment, i.e. temporary employment. The identi…cation strategy has exploited the exogenous variation in the threat of unionisation generated by the introduction of a statutory union recognition procedure in the UK.
The results di¤er depending on the speci…c type of temporary contract considered. In fact, while for …xed-term workers there is no evidence of an e¤ect, there is some support for the hypothesis of a negative e¤ect of the threat of unionisation on the probability that …rms employ agency workers. The estimates suggest a sizeable e¤ect exceeding -10%. However, due to the limited size of the groups compared in the analysis these e¤ects are not always estimated with high statistical precision.
Overall, therefore, there is no evidence that …rms which become exposed to the threat of unionisation react by hiring non-union employment. 
